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Policy Recommendations
As commander-in-chief, the next president must 
take on the challenge of rebuilding and reforming 
the American armed forces, by:
•	 Implementing	a	process	of	reevaluating	what	
has succeeded or failed in recent military 
operations, identifying future threats, and 
examining	how	to	refashion	U.S.	armed	forces	
to	meet	them.
•	 Creating	three	study	commissions:	a	Mili-
tary	Lessons-Learned	Commission,	a	Future	
Threat	Commission,	and	a	Military	Reform	
Commission.
•	 Choosing	membership	of	the	commissions	
carefully,	with	appropriate	composition	of	
military	men	and	women	and	civilian	special-
ists	as	dictated	by	specific	objectives	of	each	
commission.
•	 Maintaining	active	involvement	and	support	
for	the	commissions—the	quality	and	value	of	
their	work	depends	on	the	president’s	continu-
ing	interest.
The	Military	Reform	Commission	should:
•	 Develop	practices	for	prioritizing	“Phase	IV	
Planning”—how	to	conduct	post-hostility	
operations—before	planning	for	Phases	I-III	
(Preparation,	Shaping	the	Battlespace,	Decisive	
Operations).
•	 Explore	creating	specific	units	trained	and	
equipped to carry out peacekeeping, humani-
tarian,	and	counter-insurgency	operations.
•	 Work	to	align	military	use	of	technology	
with	ultimate	U.S.	strategic	goals,	rather	than	
immediate	tactical	advantages.
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The Importance of Defense Policy 
Rebuilding	and	reforming	the	American	armed	forces	will	be	one	of	the	paramount	
challenges	faced	by	the	next	president,	and	it	is	an	arena	in	which	he	or	she	can	exert	
particular	influence	as	commander-in-chief.	Yet,	if	in	rebuilding	our	armed	forces	the	
president	just	recreates	the	hammer,	the	United	States	will	still	have	to	treat	all	the	
world’s	problems	as	nails.	We	need	military	forces	that	can	perform	a	diverse	range	
of	tasks	in	appropriate	ways.	It	must	not	be	a	one-size-fits-all	military.	The	required	
variety	of	knowledge,	preparation,	and	ability	cannot	be	pulled	out	of	thin	air,	but	
must	already	be	incorporated	in	the	military.	
All	too	often,	liberal	academic	and	policy	elites	disdain	the	military	either	as	unknown	
territory,	ruled	by	arcane	technical	expertise,	or	as	an	alien	moral	universe,	typified	by	
the	acceptance	of	hierarchy	and	force.	Moreover,	there	seems	to	be	an	assumption	that	
all	the	United	States	requires	for	success	is	an	intelligent	foreign	policy,	and	if	called	
upon,	the	military	can	simply	implement	it	as	ordered.	However,	it	is	key	to	realize	
that foreign policy options can be limited or distorted by the character and abilities of our 
military.	The	last	five	years	in	Iraq	make	this	painfully	clear.	
The Fundamental Problem
Historically,	armed	forces	prepare	for	the	war	they	want	to	fight,	not	the	war	that	they	
may have	to	fight.	Another	way	to	say	this	is	that	militaries	have	an	idea	of	what	war	
should	be,	and	they	tend	to	act	according	to	that	idea	rather	than	to	reality.	The	most	
fundamental	task	in	military	reform	will	be	getting	the	Army,	Marine	Corps,	Navy,	
and	Air	Force	to	reconceptualize	war	in	terms	of	threat	and	response.	From	this	would	
follow	changes	in	force	structure,	planning,	training,	and	equipment.	It	is	said	that	an	
army	fights	the	way	it	trains,	but	it	trains	the	way	it	thinks.	
Study Commissions
The	first	step	would	be	to	seize	this	historical	moment	to	reevaluate	what	has	suc-
ceeded	or	failed	in	recent	military	operations,	identify	what	future	threats	loom	before	
us,	and	examine	how	we	should	refashion	the	armed	forces	to	meet	them.	Now is the 
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moment	to	act;	because	the	military	community	recognizes	that	structures	and	prac-
tices	require	reform,	the	armed	forces	are	open	to	questions	and	suggestions.	Failing	to	
undertake	this	examination	would	be	dangerous,	because	given	time,	militaries	tend	
to	develop	selective	memories,	choosing	to	forget	what	they	do	not	do	well,	as	U.S.	
forces	turned	their	backs	on	counter-insurgency	after	Vietnam.	
We	might	best	begin	the	process	by	creating	three	study	commissions,	each	with	a	dif-
ferent, but related, agenda: 
•	 Military	Lessons-Learned	Commission
•	 Future	Threat	Commission	
•	 Military	Reform	Commission
Of course the names of the study commissions can be changed, they are simply 
descriptive	here.
For	the	process	to	work,	it	cannot	just	be	forced	upon	the	military	from	the	outside.	
There	will	be	debate,	of	course,	but	an	attempt	must	be	made	to	keep	the	commis-
sions	as	collegial	as	possible.	The	military	must	be	respected	for	its	professionalism	and	
its	sacrifice.	Yet,	the	next	administration	ought	not	to	allow	vested	interests	within	the	
military to defend the status quo, demand more resources to do the same things, or 
blame	its	own	shortcomings	on	convenient	civilian	targets.	
Of	course	commissions	of	inquiry	abound	in	Washington	history,	and	the	military	has	
seen	its	share,	even	recently.	But	the	paramount	importance	of	military	reform	for	the	
next	administration	demands	we	go	at	the	process	again.	The	quality	and	value	of	the	
work	produced	will	depend	on	choosing	the	membership	of	the	commissions	carefully	
and	on	maintaining	the	active	involvement	and	support	of	the	president.
Military Lessons-Learned Commission
For	obvious	reasons,	this	body	should	be	composed	predominantly	of	military	men	
and	women.	They	must	be	noted	for	their	experience	and	intellect,	but	also	for	their	
integrity	and	moral	courage.	The	commission	should	also	include	some	civilian	spe-
cialists	without	immediate	ties	to	the	services.	
Issues	for	discussion	might	include:
•	 war	planning,	including	the	failure	to	give	proper	emphasis	to	stability	and	
security;
• logistics in support of a counter-insurgency;
•	 training	Iraq	military	and	police	forces;
•	 cultural	preparation	of	U.S.	troops,	its	promises	and	limitations;	
•	 conflict	between	the	“warrior	spirit”	and	effective	policing	operations;
•	 impact	of	terrorist	violence	on	the	ability	to	carry	out	effective	small-scale	counter-
insurgent patrolling; and
•	 numerous	technical	questions,	such	as	the	values	of	different	kinds	of	military	
equipment,	e.g.	up-armored	humvees	and	blast-resistant	vehicles;
•	 and	much	more.
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Historically, armed forces 
prepare for the war they 
want to fight, not the war 
that they may have to fight.
 3
Future Threat Commission
The	need	for	the	kind	of	work	that	this	study	group	would	do	is	obvious,	and	
something	of	this	kind	probably	exists	on	some	level	in	the	Department	of	State	or	
even	the	Pentagon,	but	the	effort	needs	to	be	given	full	attention	and	all	the	support	
possible.	The	composition	of	such	a	study	commission	would	be	only	partly	military,	
with	a	predominance	of	well-informed	and	insightful	foreign	affairs,	regional,	and	
homeland	security	experts.	It	would	have	to	consider	a	spectrum	of	threats	from	ter-
rorism	through	conventional	and	nuclear	war,	in	particular	the	need	for	interventions	
to support friendly regimes, to undermine or change hostile regimes, to ferret out 
terrorists,	to	resist	genocide,	to	aid	in	humanitarian	disasters,	etc.	The	list	may	be	well-
known	in	the	policy	community,	but	it	is	already	a	new	world,	and	it	will	continue	to	
change	after	the	current	war	in	Iraq	runs	its	course—or	enters	its	next	phase.
It	would	be	of	particular	interest	for	military	reform,	if	the	Threat	Commission	could	
suggest the military role and forces suitable to each challenge, from air-lift to the com-
mitment	of	conventional	troops.
Military Reform Commission
This	last	study	commission	would	be	the	pay	off,	because	it	would	suggest	actual	
changes	in	force-composition,	training,	and	practice.	In	the	world	of	military	reform,	
it is easier to speculate about problems and threats than to actually refashion the 
armed	forces	to	deal	with	them.	This	commission	must	again	be	mainly	composed	of	
military	personnel	whose	expertise	is	matched	by	integrity	and	moral	courage.	The	
choice	of	membership	will	be	everything.
There	is	no	predicting	exactly	what	would	come	out	of	such	an	effort,	but	there	are	
three	areas	that	ought	to	get	special	attention.	
Matters for the Military Reform Commission:  
Phase IV Planning
In	the	recent	past,	military	planning	has	followed	a	four	phase	model:	the	first	two	
(Phase	I—Preparation;	Phase	II—Shaping	the	Battlespace)	precede	the	big	clash,	
and	the	main	fighting	dominates	Phase	III—Decisive	Operations.	Our	armed	forces	
executed	the	military	parts	of	Phases	I-III	well;	they	captured	our	attention	and	the	
initial	TV	coverage.	Phase	IV—Post	Hostility	Operations,	however,	was	botched.	In	
fact,	it	was	barely	planned	for;	neither	the	Bush	regime	nor	the	military	gave	it	much	
thought.	Conrad	Crane,	Director	of	the	U.S.	Army	Military	History	Institute	at	Army	
War	College	and	a	lead	author	of	the	2006	Army	and	Marine	Corps	Counterinsur-
gency	Field	Manual,	has	argued	convincingly	that	we	need	to	change	our	approach	to	
planning.	Instead	of	thinking	first	about	Phase	I	and	working	up,	usually	regarding	
Phase	IV	as	an	afterthought,	we	should	worry	first	about	Phase	IV,	defining	what	we	
want	the	“peace”	to	look	like,	how	do	we	manage	it,	and	what	is	required	to	do	so.	
Then	you	concern	yourself	with	Phases	III,	II,	and	I	to	set	up	success	in	Phase	IV.	My	
term	for	this	would	be	“Phase	IV	Planning.”	
The	failure	to	put	Phase	IV	center	stage	can	be	blamed	on	a	number	of	people;	
Donald	Rumsfeld	and	Dick	Cheney	top	many	lists,	but	the	military	itself	cannot	
escape	blame.	Frankly,	they	consider	fighting	their	business,	and	that	does	not	include	
the	messy	matter	of	creating	and	maintaining	security	after	the	tanks	have	stopped	
rolling.	Here	is	a	prime	example	of	why	the	military	must	reconceptualize	war.	
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The most fundamental task 
in military reform will be 
getting the Army, Marine 
Corps, Navy, and Air Force to 
reconceptualize war in terms of 
threat and response.
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General	Anthony	Zinni	spoke	critically	and	presciently	on	this	point	in	early	Septem-
ber	2003,	before	the	worst	excesses	of	sectarian	violence	occurred:
What	strikes	me	is	that	we	are	constantly	redesigning	the	military	to	do	some-
thing	it	already	does	pretty	well.	I	mean	…	breaking	the	organized	resistance	
in	Iraq,	even	though	it	may	not	have	been	the	greatest	army	in	the	world,	was	
done	extremely	well.	We’re	very	proud	of	our	troops	and	very	proud	of	the	way	
that	was	executed	and	led.	But	it	wasn’t	enough.	At	the	end	of	the	third	inning	
we	declared	victory	and	said	the	game’s	over.	It	ain’t	over.	It	isn’t	going	to	be	over	
in	future	wars.	If	we’re	talking	about	the	future,	we	need	to	talk	about	not	how	
you	win	the	peace	as	a	separate	part	of	the	war,	but	you’ve	got	to	look	at	this	
thing	from	start	to	finish.	It’s	not	a	phased	conflict;	there	isn’t	a	fighting	part	
and	then	another	part.	
Our	armed	forces	are	“constantly	redesigning	the	military	to	do	something	it	already	
does	pretty	well,”	because	that	is	what	is	considered	to	be	real	war,	because	that	is	the	
military’s	comfort	zone.	Another	observation	by	a	field	commander	makes	the	point	
in	a	different	way.	Commenting	on	his	unit’s	responsibilities	in	Iraq	during	December	
2003,	U.S.	Army	Lieutenant	Colonel	William	Darley	remarked:	“What	we	have	here	
is	basically	a	constabulary	action.	…We’ve	seen	almost	nothing	above	the	squad	level.	
Basically	this	is	not	a	real	war.”	
Matters for the Military Reform Commission:  
Phase IV Forces
In	regard	to	the	composition	and	employment	of	American	forces,	the	most	immedi-
ate	concern	of	voters	is	the	multiple	long-term	deployments	of	troops	to	Iraq.	The	
strain	on	reserve	and	National	Guard	units	causes	the	greatest	anguish.	We	need	to	
reevaluate	the	relationship	between	reserve	and	full-time	forces;	however,	the	ultimate	
solution	to	the	problem	lies	in	avoiding	such	long	combat	commitments,	unless	the	
nation	is	fully	mobilized	for	war.	All	this	is	very	important,	and	also	fairly	obvious,	but 
need for reorganization and reform goes much deeper.	
Darley	defined	his	duty	in	Iraq	as	“a	constabulary	action.”	That	is	a	good	term	for	it,	
and	to	carry	out	such	an	action,	we	need	constabulary	forces,	no	matter	what	they	
might	be	called.	We	need	some	military	units	particularly	organized,	equipped,	and	
trained	for	Phase	IV—or	peacekeeping,	humanitarian	operations,	counter-insurgency,	
and	other	interventions	below	the	threshold	of	conventional	battle.	
Augmentation	in	numbers	could	be	wasted	if	it	only	goes	to	create	more	maneuver	
units, that is the infantry, artillery, armor, and air used for a main clash on the battle-
field.	Lately,	the	U.S.	Army	underwent	“Transformation”	which	certainly	changed	
the	organizational	chart	by	emphasizing	brigade-size	units	that	could	be	more	flexibly	
employed.	But	when	examining	the	nature	of	these	units	carefully,	one	discovers	that	
the	amount	of	armored	troops	meant	for	the	battlefield	increased,	not	decreased.	If	the	
military	spends	its	funding	to	buy	more	stuff	“to	do	something	it	already	does	pretty	
well,”	such	money	could	also	be	wasted.
In the world of military 
reform, it is easier to speculate 
about problems and threats 
than to actually refashion the 
armed forces to deal with them.
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The	largest	worldwide	growth	in	armed	forces	has	come	in	units	intended	for	inter-
nal	security,	not	the	battlefield;	China	and	India	field	about	a	million	each.	For	legal	
reasons,	the	U.S.	lacks	such	a	gendarmerie,	with	the	exception	of	the	Coast	Guard.	We 
should explore creating specific units whose primary purpose is overseas constabulary opera-
tions.	Such	units	would	emphasize	light	infantry,	military	police,	civil	affairs,	intel-
ligence,	engineers,	communications,	and	finance.	They	could	probably	ramp	up	more	
easily	into	combat	infantry,	if	need	be,	than	could	combat	infantry	be	ramped	down	
for	constabulary	use,	although	many	soldiers	would	disagree	with	this	assertion.
We	would	have	to	redirect	values	and	expectations	to	create	true	constabulary	units.	
The “warrior spirit” is not easily adjusted to peacekeeping. Once after a briefing on the 
need	for	limiting	and	focusing	violence	in	counter-insurgency,	an	experienced	top	
sergeant	agreed,	but	then	asked	what	he	could	do	about	the	fact	that	his	teenage	
Marines	had	signed	up	to	pull	the	trigger.	Constabulary	units	must	be	imbued	with	a	
constabulary	spirit.	Once	again,	rethinking	the	role	of	force	is	basic.
Matters for the Military Reform Commission:  
Dependence on Technology
American	military	technology	is	the	most	sophisticated	in	the	world,	and	we	should	
take	full	advantage	of	it,	guided	by	the	context	of	specific	military	operations.	Since	
World	War	II,	the	American	military	has	become	increasingly	obsessed	with	technol-
ogy.	Part	of	this	results	from	an	understandable	determination	to	achieve	desired	
effects	with	hardware	not	human	beings,	and	so	limit	casualties.	Part	of	it	derives	from	
the	accurate	observation	that	we	enjoy	an	important	advantage	here	and	ought	to	
stress	it.	And	part	of	it	grows	out	of	the	links	between	the	armed	forces	and	defense	
industry.	Be	as	it	may,	technology	can	accomplish	great	things,	but	the	confidence	that	
we	can	solve	military	problems	by	injecting	new	technological	fixes	can	be	counterpro-
ductive,	particularly	in	constabulary,	counter-insurgent,	and	peacekeeping	operations.	
I	recall	a	talk	by	a	high-ranking	and	intelligent	Air	Force	general.	As	is	so	often	the	
case,	he	began	by	showing	film	clips	of	precision	bombing.	In	one	of	these,	two	
snipers,	revealed	by	thermal	imaging,	retreated	into	a	large	building	where	they	disap-
peared	to	take	cover.	An	air-launched	precision	guided	weapon	then	obliterated	the	
building,	and	the	military	audience	at	the	talk	applauded.	But	there	was	apparently	
no	way	of	judging	if	that	building	was	empty	or	inhabited	by	frightened	families	
crouching	in	their	apartments	in	hope	that	the	battle	would	pass	them	by.	Use	of	
high-tech	weaponry	at	that	moment	may	have	caused	great	harm	to	innocent	civilians	
and	earned	the	United	States	the	undying	enmity	of	the	relatives	and	friends	of	those	
killed.	
Technology must be consistent not only with some immediate tactical advantage but with 
our ultimate strategic goals.	Indeed,	heaven	save	us	from	the	latest	technological	catch-
word	coming	out	of	the	Pentagon.	The	greatest	“Shock	and	Awe”	associated	with	the	
Iraq	war	was	not	the	disorientation	of	Saddam	Hussein’s	leadership,	but	the	disillu-
sionment	of	the	American	people.
After a briefing on the need 
for limiting and focusing 
violence in counter-insurgency, 
an experienced top sergeant 
agreed, but then asked what he 
could do about the fact that his 
teenage Marines had signed up 
to pull the trigger.
D E F E N S E  P O L I C Y :  R E g E N E R A T I N g  T H E  A M E R I C A N  M I L I T A R Y
6  A C D I S  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  S E C U R I T Y  P O L I C Y  B R I E F
Established at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign in 1978, the Program in 
Arms Control, Disarmament, and International 
Security (ACDIS) is comprised of faculty, stu-
dents, and visiting scholars drawn from diverse 
academic disciplines. Program affiliates pursue 
advanced research to address relevant issues in 
international security. ACDIS receives funding 
from the State of Illinois, private foundations, 
and federal government agencies. 
http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu
The views expressed in this publication are those of 
the author and do not necessarily represent the views 
of ACDIS, the University of Illinois, or the institu-
tions that support them.
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, 
and International Security (ACDIS)
359	Armory	Building,	MC-533
505	East	Armory	Avenue
Champaign,	IL	61820	USA
ACDIS
Editor’s Note
ACDIS	integrates	diverse	academic	and	military	perspectives	into	its	research	and	
dialogue on Reconceptualizing War.	This	effort	covers	a	set	of	related	topics,	
including:	policies	and	practices	in	contemporary	warfighting;	military	uses	of	
technology;	origins,	history,	and	causes	of	war;	military	strategy;	quantitative	and	
qualitative	geospatial	and	geopolitical	analyses	of	conflict;	sociological	impacts	of	
war;	and	U.S.	and	international	military	force	structures.	We	are	pleased	to	offer	
this	brief	on	U.S.	defense	policy	as	part	of	the	Program’s	continuing	commitment	
to	the	study	of	these	issues.
We	are	grateful	to	the	John	D.	and	Catherine	T.	MacArthur	Foundation	for	its	
partial	support	of	the	ACDIS	International	Security	Policy	Brief	series	through	a	
Science,	Technology,	and	Security	Initiative	grant	to	the	University	of	Illinois.
Matt	Rosenstein 
ACDIS Associate Director
